Abstract. In this short paper we formally prove that designing attribute-based encryption schemes cannot be easier than designing identity-based encryption schemes. In more detail, we show how an attribute-based encryption scheme which admits, at least, AND policies can be combined with a collision-resistant hash function to obtain an identity-based encryption scheme. Even if this result may seem natural, not surprising at all, it has not been explicitly written anywhere, as far as we know. Furthermore, it may be an unknown result for some people: Odelu et al. [8, 6] have proposed both an attribute-based encryption scheme in the Discrete Logarithm setting, without bilinear pairings, and an attributebased encryption scheme in the RSA setting, both admitting AND policies. If these schemes were secure, then by using the implication that we prove in this paper, we would obtain secure identity-based encryption schemes in both the RSA and the Discrete Logarithm settings, without bilinear pairings, which would be a breakthrough in the area. Unfortunately, we present here complete attacks of the two schemes proposed by Odelu et al. in [8, 6] .
Introduction
In a classical encryption scheme, for both the symmetric and asymmetric settings, a message is encrypted so that a single user, in possession of a secret key, can decrypt and recover the original plaintext. In the last years, other cryptographic paradigms have been proposed so that the sender of the message encrypts it in such a way that, later, many different users will be able to decrypt, as long as their identities, attributes or credentials are enough. In particular, maybe a user who is not registered in the system at the time where a message is encrypted can later decrypt it. Identity-based and attribute-based encryption are perhaps the two instantiations of these alternative paradigms that have attracted more attention from the cryptographic community. These paradigms are suitable for situations where many different kinds of users and data are in place: social networks, the Internet of Things, Cloud storage and Cloud computation, analysis of big data, etc.
A ciphertext computed by an identity-based encryption (IBE, for short) scheme for a specific identity id can be decrypted only by the user(s) holding this exact identity id. Other users, having secret keys for other identities id = id, must obtain nothing useful on the plaintext. In a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (ABE, for short) scheme, decryption can be performed only by users who hold a subset of attributes A ⊂ P that satisfy some policy Γ ⊂ 2 P chosen by the sender of the message. An adversary who obtains secret keys for other subsets of attributes B 1 , . . . , B q cannot obtain any information on the plaintext, if B i / ∈ Γ holds for all i = 1, . . . , q. This collusion-resistance property must hold even if the union of (some of) the subsets B i gives a subset in Γ , maybe the whole set P of attributes.
Both identity and attribute-based encryption are particular instantiations of more general notions that have been introduced later, like predicate encryption or functional encryption. The notion of identity-based encryption [10] was generalized to the notion of fuzzy identity-based encryption [9] , which was then generalized to the notion of attribute-based encryption [3, 1] , with two flavours: key-policy and ciphertext-policy. Therefore, it seems natural to believe that identity-based encryption is a particular case, an instantiation, of attribute-based encryption. However, the two aforementioned generalizations add some modifications to the initial notion of identity-based encryption, which could potentially affect this natural chain of implications. Namely, in identity-based encryption, the set of possible identities may have exponential size on the security parameter, whereas in attribute-based encryption the set of attributes has polynomial size. Therefore, the natural instantiation of seeing each identity as an attribute, does not work. Even the solution of assigning to each identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id ) ∈ {0, 1} the set of attributes B id = {at i | id i = 1} does not work, because two different identities id = id can potentially lead to two subsets of attributes B id , B id such that B id ⊂ B id , which prevents us from reducing the security of one scheme to the security of the other one, for instance if (id, B id ) correspond to the challenge identity and (id , B id ) correspond to an extraction query.
Our Contributions
Although these first two attempts to prove that ABE implies IBE do not work, we provide a way of proving such implication. We start with an ABE scheme which admits, at least, AND policies on a set of 2 attributes; by using a collision-resistance hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} , we derive an IBE scheme for arbitrary identities. The security of the resulting IBE scheme is the same as that of the initial ABE scheme.
We detail this construction for the case of ciphertext-policy ABE, but from the construction itself it is clear that the same can be done by starting from a key-policy ABE scheme. Therefore, the first contribution of the paper is to formally prove that any ABE scheme which admits at least AND policies can be transformed into an IBE scheme. As a direct consequence of this result, by using [2] , we obtain that designing (meaningful) ABE schemes from public-key encryption or trapdoor permutations, in a black-box way, is impossible.
The result that designing (minimally useful) ABE schemes cannot be easier than designing IBE schemes may sound as a natural, folkloric, well-known result; however, we have not found any explicit formal proof of it. Furthermore, there seems to be some people in the cryptographic community who are not aware of this implication. Namely, Odelu and Das [8] have proposed a CP-ABE scheme, admitting AND policies, in the Discrete Logarithm setting, without bilinear pairings, along with a proof of security for it. Very recently, the same authors, along with other colleagues, have proposed another CP-ABE scheme, admitting AND policies, in the RSA setting [6] . With the result that we prove in this paper, a direct consequence would be the first IBE scheme in the Discrete Logarithm setting, without bilinear pairings, and the first efficient IBE scheme in the RSA setting. These two schemes would be a breakthrough result in cryptography, so we may suspect that some of the proofs (security of the ABE schemes by Odelu et al., or security of the ABE ⇒ IBE implication) is incorrect. Indeed, we give an explicit attack against the two CP-ABE schemes proposed by Odelu et al. in [8, 6] . In particular, the existence of such attacks means that the security analysis provided in [8, 6] must be wrong at some point.
Therefore, the existence of IBE or ABE schemes in the Discrete Logarithm setting, without bilinear pairings, remains as an open problem. The same happens for efficient schemes in the RSA setting. We note that relaxed versions of these notions, such as bounded-IBE and bounded-ABE, can be obtained in this setting [11, 4, 5] .
Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the notions of identity-based encryption and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption schemes: we give the syntax definition and the required security properties for such schemes. We describe in Section 3 the transformation that constructs, from a ciphertextpolicy attribute-based encryption scheme, an identity-based encryption scheme. We formally prove that this transformation preserves security: if the initial ABE scheme is secure, so it is the resulting IBE scheme. In Section 4 we present an explicit attack that totally breaks the attribute-based encryption scheme of Odelu and Das [8] . In Section 5 we do the same with the attribute-based encryption scheme of Jo et al. [6] . We conclude the paper in Section 6, with some final remarks and (hard) open problems.
IBE and ABE: Protocols and Security

IBE: Syntactic Definition
An identity-based encryption (IBE, from now on) scheme IBE consists of four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
-IBE.Setup(1 λ ). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ; it outputs some public parameters pms and a master secret key msk. -IBE.KeyGen(id, msk, pms). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master secret key msk, the public parameters pms and an identity id ∈ {0, 1} * . The output is a private key sk id . -IBE.Encrypt(m, id, pms). The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters pms, a message m and an identity id. The output is a ciphertext C. -IBE.Decryption(C, id, sk id , pms). The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext C, an identity id, a secret key sk id and the public parameters pms. The output is a messagem.
The property of correctness requires that, if the following four protocols are run: (msk, pms) ← IBE.Setup(1 λ ), sk i d ← IBE.KeyGen(id, msk, pms), C ← IBE.Encrypt(m, id, pms) andm ← IBE.Decryption(C, id, sk id , pms), then it holdsm = m.
IBE: Security Definition
The usual security notion for encryption schemes is indistinguishability of ciphertexts under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA security). In the setting of IBE, an attacker is also allowed to query for secret keys for identities different from the identity id * that will be used to generate the challenge ciphertext. To formally define the resulting security notion, we consider the following experiment involving a challenger and an adversary A IBE .
1. The challenger chooses a random bit b R ← {0, 1}, runs (pms, msk) ← IBE.Setup(1 λ ) and sends pms to A IBE . 2. A IBE can make secret key queries for identities id ∈ {0, 1} * of his choice. To answer such a query, the challenger runs sk id ← IBE.KeyGen(id, msk, pms) and sends sk id to A IBE . 3. At some point, A IBE sends two plaintexts m (0) = m (1) and a challenge identity id * to the challenger, where id * = id, for all the identities id for which a secret key has been queried in step 3. 4. The challenger runs C * ← IBE.Encrypt(m (b) , id * , pms) and sends the challenge ciphertext C * to A IBE . 5. A IBE can make more secret key queries for more identities id, as long as id = id * . 6. Finally, A IBE outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
The advantage of A IBE in breaking the IND-CPA property of the IBE scheme is defined as
Definition 1. An identity-based encryption scheme is indistinguishable under adaptive chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA secure) if, for any adversary A IBE that runs in polynomial time, the advantage Adv
(λ) is negligible in the security parameter λ.
We recall that a function f (λ) is said to be negligible if it decreases (as λ increases) faster than the inverse of any polynomial.
A weaker security notion for IBE schemes is selective IND-CPA security, which is defined by a very similar game. The difference is that the attacker must choose the identity id * at the very beginning, before step 1 of the experiment.
CP-ABE: Syntactic Definition
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE, from now on) scheme ABE consists of four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
-ABE.Setup(1 λ , U, F). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ, the total universe of attributes U = {at 1 , . . . , at n } and the family F of decryption policies that the scheme supports. It outputs some public parameters pms and a master secret key msk.
-ABE.KeyGen(A, msk, pms). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master secret key msk, the public parameters pms and a set of attributes A ⊂ U satisfied by the user. The output is a private key sk A . -ABE.Encrypt(m, P, Γ, pms). The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters pms, a message m and a decryption policy (P, Γ ) where P ⊂ U and Γ ⊂ 2 P satisfies Γ ∈ F. The output is a ciphertext C. -ABE.Decryption(C, P, Γ, sk S , pms). The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext C, a decryption policy (P, Γ ), a secret key sk A and the public parameters pms. The output is a messagem.
The property of correctness requires that, if the following four protocols are run: (msk, pms) ← ABE.Setup(1 λ , U, F), sk A ← ABE.KeyGen(A, msk, pms), C ← ABE.Encrypt(m, P, Γ, pms) andm ← ABE.Decryption(C, P, Γ, sk S , pms), then it holdsm = m, if A ∩ P ∈ Γ and Γ ∈ F.
Regarding the family F of admitted decryption policies, F may for instance contain all the possible policies, F = {Γ ⊂ 2 U }, or may contain all the monotone increasing policies, F = {Γ ⊂ 2 U , Γ is monotone increasing}, where Γ is monotone increasing if A ∈ Γ, A ⊂ B implies B ∈ Γ . Some schemes may support only threshold decryption policies, F = {Γ (t,P) , P ⊂ U, 1 ≤ t ≤ |P|}, and Γ (t,P) = {A ⊂ P s.t. |A| ≥ t}. A particular, more restrictive, case of threshold policies corresponds to AND policies, of the form Γ (|P|,P) = {P}, containing only one subset, P ⊂ U. Since the CP-ABE schemes studied in this paper support AND policies, we will refer to these policies as F AND = {Γ (|P|,P) s.t. P ⊂ U}.
CP-ABE: Security Definition
In the setting of CP-ABE, an attacker against the IND-CPA security of the scheme is allowed to query for secret keys for different subsets of users, as long as none of these subsets is authorized for the decryption policy (P, Γ ) which will be used to generate the challenge ciphertext.
To formally define the resulting security notion, we consider the following experiment involving a challenger and an adversary A ABE .
1. The adversary A ABE chooses the universe of attributes U and the family of policies F. 2. The challenger chooses a random bit b R ← {0, 1}, runs (pms, msk) ← ABE.Setup(1 λ , U, F) and sends pms to A ABE . 3. A ABE can make secret key queries for subsets of attributes A i ⊂ U of his choice. To answer such a query, the challenger runs sk A i ← ABE.KeyGen(A i , msk, pms) and sends sk A i to A ABE . 4. At some point, A ABE sends two plaintexts m (0) = m (1) and a decryption policy (P * , Γ * ) to the challenger, where P * ⊂ U, Γ * ∈ F and A i ∩ P * / ∈ Γ * , for all the subsets A i for which a secret key has been queried in step 3. 5. The challenger runs C * ← ABE.Encrypt(m (b) , P * , Γ * , pms) and sends the challenge ciphertext C * to A ABE . 6. A ABE can make more secret key queries for subsets of attributes A i , as long as A i ∩ P * / ∈ Γ * . 7. Finally, A ABE outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
The advantage of A ABE in breaking the IND-CPA property of the CP-ABE scheme is defined as A weaker security notion for CP-ABE schemes is selective IND-CPA security, which is defined by a very similar game. The difference is that the attacker must choose the policy (P, Γ ) at the very beginning, in step 1 of the experiment.
CP-ABE Implies IBE
The main result of this paper is that ABE implies IBE. This implication holds for the two existing flavours of ABE, ciphertext-policy and key-policy. We will detail the result (construction and security proof) for the case of ciphertext-policy ABE, but since the policies involved in the construction are AND policies, which can be thought as a "having all the attributes from a specific subset", it is clear that the same result holds if we start from a key-policy ABE, by swapping the roles of secret keys and ciphertexts.
The Transformation
Let ABE = (ABE.Setup, ABE.KeyGen, ABE.Encrypt, ABE.Decrypt) be a CP-ABE scheme admitting, at least, AND policies. Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} be a hash function.
An IBE scheme IBE = (IBE.Setup, IBE.KeyGen, IBE.Encrypt, IBE.Decrypt) is constructed as follows.
-IBE.Setup: run (pms ABE , msk ABE ) ← ABE.Setup(1 λ , U, F), for U = {at 1,0 , at 1,1 , . . . , at ,0 , at ,1 } (n = 2 attributes), and F ⊃ F AND = {Γ (|P|,P) s.t. P ⊂ U}. The master secret key of IBE is msk IBE = msk ABE , the public parameters of IBE are pms IBE = (pms ABE , H). -IBE.KeyGen: given an identity id ∈ {0, 1} * , let H(id) i denote the i-th bit of H(id), for i = 1, . . . , . Define the subset A id ⊂ U, which contains attributes, as
The secret key for identity id is defined as sk id ← ABE.KeyGen(pms ABE , A id , msk ABE ), the ABE secret key for the subset of attributes A id . -IBE.Encrypt: given a plaintext m and an identity id, consider the AND policy Γ (|P|,P) for the subset P = A id . The ciphertext for this pair (m, id) is defined as C ← ABE.Encrypt(m, P, Γ (|P|,P) , pms ABE ). -IBE.Decrypt: given a ciphertext C for an identity id and the secret key sk id for that identity, the decryption protocol outputs the plaintext obtained by running m ← ABE.Decrypt(C, P, Γ (|P|,P) , sk id , pms ABE ).
Security of the Transformation
We are going to prove that, if the scheme ABE is secure, then the scheme IBE is secure, too. We are going to consider adaptive (full) security for both schemes. The analogous result with selective security for both the CP-ABE and IBE schemes may be proved in a very similar way.
Theorem 1.
If ABE is IND-CPA secure and H is a collision-resistant hash function, then IBE is IND-CPA secure.
Proof. To prove this result, we assume the existence of a successful adversary A IBE against the IND-CPA security of the scheme IBE and we design an adversary A ABE against the IND-CPA security of the CPA-ABE scheme ABE.
In the IND-CPA experiment for A ABE , a bit b R ← {0, 1} is first chosen at random. Then the adversary A ABE that we are designing asks for the execution of ABE.Setup, for a security parameter λ, a universe U = {at 1,0 , at 1,1 , . . . , at ,0 , at ,1 } of n = 2 attributes and for a family F of decryption policies which contains AND policies, F ⊃ F AND = {Γ (|P|,P) s.t. P ⊂ U }. As a result of this execution of ABE.Setup, the adversary A ABE receives some public parameters pms ABE . At this point, A ABE initializes an execution of the adversary A IBE , by providing him with his initial input, the public parameeters of the identity-based scheme IBE, which are set to be pms IBE = (pms ABE , H).
The adversary A IBE can, from this point on, make secret key queries for identities id of his choice. To answer such queries, our adversary A ABE proceeds as follows.
-Let H(id) i denote the i-th bit of H(id). Define the subset
-Making use of the secret key queries that A ABE can make, he asks for a secret key for the subset of attributes A id . As the answer, A ABE gets sk A id ← ABE.KeyGen(pms ABE , A id , msk ABE ). -Send to A IBE the secret key sk id = sk A id .
At some point A IBE outputs two different plaintexts, m (0) , m (1) and a challenge identity id * such that id * = id, for all the identities id for which A IBE made a secret key query. Since H is assumed to be a collision resistance hash function, we have H(id * ) = H(id), for all queried identities m. Therefore, the subset of attributes P * = A id * = {at i,H(id * ) i , 1 ≤ i ≤ } satisfies that P * ⊂ A id , for all queried identities id. Indeed, for each queried identity id, let j ∈ {1, . . . , } be such that H(id * ) j = H(id) j . We have at j,H(id * ) j ∈ P * and at j,H(id * ) j / ∈ A id , so P * ⊂ A id . Therefore, there cannot be any inclusion relation between A id and P * .
This means that, for all queried identities id, we have that the subset A id does not satisfy the AND policy Γ (|P * |,P * ) and thus, A ABE can choose Γ (|P|,P) as the challenge policy. A ABE chooses the same two messages m (0) , m (1) . A ABE sends these two messages, along with the subset of attributes P * and the policy Γ * = Γ (|P|,P) , and gets as answer a challenge ciphertext C * ← ABE.Encrypt(m (b) , P * , Γ (|P|,P) , pms ABE ).
A ABE gives to A IBE the challenge ciphertext C * . If A IBE makes more secret key queries, for id = id * , they are answered as the previous ones, and the same argument that the subsets of attributes A id do not satisfy the AND policy Γ * is valid.
Finally, when A IBE outputs a bit b , our adversary A ABE outputs the same bit b . Obviously, we have that Adv
(λ), which concludes the proof.
An Attack against the CP-ABE Scheme in [8]
In [8] , Odelu and Das propose a CP-ABE scheme which supports AND decryption policies and which works in the classical, pairing-free, Discrete Logarithm setting. They prove that the scheme enjoys selective IND-CPA security. In this section we show that their security analysis must be incorrect at some point, because we provide an explicit attack against the scheme. Since the attack we are going to present is a key-recovery attack, stronger than breaking IND-CPA security, we will describe only (the necessary parts of) the Setup and Key Generation protocols of their CP-ABE scheme, which will be enough to, later, understand the proposed attack. The details of the Encrypt and Decrypt protocols are thus not necessary; we simply assume that they satisfy the standard correctness property.
Description of the CP-ABE Scheme in [8]
The typical Discrete Logarithm framework consists of a cyclic group G of prime order p. Examples of such groups are some groups of points in elliptic curves or subgroups of Z q , when p|q − 1. We will use additive notation in G, to follow the same notation as in [8] . That is, G = {aP, a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}}, where P is a generator of G.
Their scheme supports AND decryption policies Γ (|P|,P) , defined on the total universe U = {at 1 , . . . , at n } of attributes. They use the following notation: any subset A ⊂ U will be represented by an n-bit string a 1 a 2 . . . a n , where a i = 1 if at i ∈ A, and a i = 0 if at i / ∈ A. For example, if n = 4 and A = {at 1 , at 4 }, then the bit string corresponding to A is 1001.
With this notation, an AND decryption policy Γ (|P|,P) may be represented by the bit string b 1 b 2 . . . b n corresponding to subset P. If A is a subset of attributes (held by a user), with bit string a 1 a 2 . . . a n , the condition that must be satisfied in order for that user to decrypt, A ∩ P ∈ Γ (|P|,P) , which is equivalent to P ⊂ A, becomes a i ≥ b i , ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
We are now ready to describe the Setup and Key Generation protocols of the scheme in [8] .
Setup(1 λ , U, F AND ). The setup algorithm starts by choosing a cyclic group G of prime order p, such that p is λ bits long, and a generator P of G. A hash function H 4 : {0, 1} * → Z * p is also chosen.
Then, three random elements α, k 1 , k 2 ∈ Z p are chosen. For each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, the values P i = α i P ,
The master secret key is msk = (α, k 1 , k 2 ). The public parameters of the system are pms = (p,
KeyGen(A, msk, pms). The key generation algorithm takes as input a subset of attributes A ⊂ U, the master secret key msk and the public parameters pms.
Let a 1 a 2 . . . a n be the bit string corresponding to subset A. Let us define the polynomial f (x, A) = n i=1 (x + H 4 (i)) 1−a i , which has degree n − |A|.
Two random numbers r u , t u ∈ Z p are chosen. A value s u is computed, such that the relation 1 f (α,A) = k 1 s u + k 2 r u mod p is satisfied. That is:
Finally, the values u 1 = r u + k 1 t u mod p and u 2 = s u − k 2 t u mod p are computed and the secret key is set to be sk A = (u 1 , u 2 ).
Remark. The vulnerability of the scheme comes from the fact that a secret key sk A = (u 1 , u 2 ) does not have enough entropy. Although two random and independent values, r u , t u , are generated, the final two elements u 1 and u 2 are not independent. If we write in matrix notation the relation between the pairs (r u , t u ) and (u 1 , u 2 ), we have
The matrix is not invertible: the second row is equal to the first one multiplied with −
. Therefore, we have that
The Attack
The attack is based on three simple observations.
(1) From two secret queries for the subset of attributes A, it is easy to recover the values X := −
Indeed, according to the remark at the end of previous section, from the first secret key query we will get a pair (u 1 , u 2 ) such that
From the second secret key query for subset A, we will get a pair (u 1 , u 2 ) such that
We can consider the following system of equations, in matrix notation (and using the notation X := − 
Since u 1 = u 2 mod p with overwhelming probability, the matrix is invertible and we can recover (X, Y A ) from the two secret key queries.
(2) For each subset of attributes B, knowledge of the pair (X, Y B ) is enough to produce a valid secret key sk B for subset B.
Again, from the remark at the end of previous section, the only thing we have to do is to choose u 1 ∈ Z p at random and compute
The resulting key sk B = (u 1 , u 2 ) has the same probability distribution as in a real execution of KeyGen(B, msk, pms). For instance, let us take n = 3 and the subsets of attributes defined by bit strings A 1 = 001, A 2 = 110, A 3 = 010, B = 101. It is easy to check that the following equality holds
Now, for these subsets of attributes, we have
We are now ready to explain the attack, for this particular set of four subsets A 1 = 001, A 2 = 110, A 3 = 010, B = 101 in a universe with n = 3 attributes. We are designing a selective attack, so we can choose the policy for the challenge ciphertext in advance, as Γ (|P|,P) for P = B = 101.
1. Use (1): make two secret queries for each of the subsets of attributes A 1 , A 2 , A 3 . Since none of these attributes satisfy policy Γ (|P|,P) , these are all valid secret key queries. As a result, obtain the values Actually, this is a key-recovery attack, even stronger than an attack against the IND-CPA property. In any case, the conclusion is that the CP-ABE scheme in [8] is not secure.
5 An Attack against the CP-ABE Scheme in [6] In [6] , Odelu, Das and other colleagues have recently proposed another CP-ABE scheme which supports AND decryption policies, this time in the RSA setting. Once again, they prove that the scheme enjoys selective IND-CPA security. In this section we show that their security analysis must be incorrect, too, because we provide an explicit attack against the scheme.
Description of the CP-ABE Scheme in [6]
The RSA framework consists of a an integer N = pq, product of two big prime numbers. Any integer g satisfying gcd(g, N ) = 1 enjoys the property g φ(N ) = 1 mod N , where φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Factoring N is a very hard problem; this implies that computing φ(N ) from N is also very hard.
The scheme in [6] supports AND decryption policies Γ (|P|,P) , defined on the total universe U = {at 1 , . . . , at n } of attributes. They use the same notation as in [8] for representing subsets and policies, with an n-bit string representing any subset A ⊂ U. We describe now the relevant parts of some protocols of the scheme in [6] , i.e., those necessary to understand our attack. Setup(1 λ , U, F AND ) . The setup algorithm starts by choosing two prime numbers p, q such that N = pq is λ bits long, along with a random element g satisfying gcd(g, N ) = 1. Then, if U contains n attributes, one has to choose n (prime) numbers p 1 , . . . , p n with gcd(p i , φ(N )) = 1, and compute their inverses modulo φ(N ), that is q i = p −1 i mod φ(N ), for i = 1, . . . , n. Then, two random integers x, k are chosen, satisfying gcd(k, φ(N )) = 1 and gcd(x, q i ) = gcd(k, q i ) = 1, for all i = 1, . . . , n. The following values are then computed:
The master secret key is msk = (x, k, p, q, q 1 , . . . , q n ) . The public parameters of the system are pms = (N, g, D U , Y, R, p 1 , . . . , p n ).
The value d A = at i ∈A q i is computed. The secret value for this subset A of attributes is a random pair sk A = (k 1 , k 2 ) satisfying the condition k · k 1 + x · k 2 = d A mod φ(N ) (a possible way to generate such a pair of integers is decribed in [6] ).
Encrypt(P, m, pms). The encryption algorithm takes as input an AND policy, defined by a subset of attributes P ⊂ U, a plaintext m and the public parameters pms. The encryption consists of a one-time pad of m using the session key derived from the value K m = g , where r m is a random value chosen by the sender. This one-time pad is combined with the standard techniques (using hash functions) to achieve chosen-ciphertext security. The ciphertext contains additional elements Y m = Y rm and R m = R rm , but the security of the encryption, in principle, is due to the fact that only users with a secret key sk A satisfying P ⊂ A will be able to compute the value K m from pms, Y m , R m and sk A .
Indeed, if sk A = (k 1 , k 2 ) satisfies k · k 1 + x · k 2 = d A mod φ(N ), then the user can compute the integer α = The bad news are that this is not the only way to compute K m , as we will show in the next section: an adversary can combine secret keys for some subsets of attributes that do not contain P and still compute K m . Therefore, the scheme is insecure because an adversary controlling users who, individually, do not satisfy policy P is able to decrypt a ciphertext addressed to policy P.
The Attack
Consider the case with n = 2 attributes in total, U = {at 1 , at 2 }. We will consider a ciphertext computed for the policy P = U = {at 1 , at 2 }, and will show that an adversary who requests a secret key for subsets B 1 = {at 1 } and B 2 = {at 2 } is able to decrypt the ciphertext.
The ciphertexts contains elements Y m = Y rm = g xrm and R m = R rm = g krm , and the inherent one-time secret key for one-time pad is K m = g rmq 1 q 2 .
As a result of the secret key query for subset B 1 , the adversary gets sk B 1 = (k
1 , k
2 ) such that k · k
1 + x · k (1) 2 = q 1 mod φ(N ). As a result of the secret key query for subset B 2 , the adversary gets sk B 2 = (k (2) 1 , k (2) 2 ) such that k · k 
